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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 It is often said that there are two sure things in life: death and 
taxes. Sometimes the two converge, and together form what is hate-
fully referred to as the “death tax.”1 For as much as the average 
American grimaces at the twenty or thirty percent taken from their 
paycheck each month, they downright despise the fact that the same 
money could be taxed again at their death. With that, some Ameri-
cans fear the knocking of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) at their 
deathbed just as voraciously as they do the grim reaper. As a result, 
taxpayers and their very able tax advisors have toiled to formulate 
                                                                                                                    
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2003, Florida State University College of Law; B.A. Florida 
State University, 1998. Special thanks to my best friend and tax guru, Jesse Little, whose 
patience and advice on this Comment (and so much more) has been invaluable to me.  
Thanks J-Lit, I couldn’t have done this without you. 
 1. Mike Allen, Rove Urges “War” for Permanent Repeal of Estate Tax, WASH. POST, 
June 14, 2002, at A5. 
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numerous trap doors and escape routes through the endless maze of 
tax codes, revenue rulings, and case law, all in the name of avoiding 
the dreaded “death tax.” 
 One of the more ubiquitous of these tax avoidance tools is the 
Crummey power. Named after the 1968 Ninth Circuit case, Crum-
mey v. Commissioner,2 Crummey powers have morphed from a 
mechanism originally designed to level the estate tax playing field3 
into a powerful estate planning tool, used by some to siphon off large 
portions of their estate free and clear of any estate or gift tax impli-
cations. On its face, such a tool seems to be plainly at odds with the 
purpose and design of the estate and gift tax structure. Despite this 
seemingly obvious abuse, in the thirty-four years since Crummey, the 
IRS has been relatively ineffective in leveling an attack of any sig-
nificance against the massive estate tax avoidance precipitated by 
the advent of Crummey powers. As a result, the Crummey power has 
become a firmly entrenched tool in the estate planners’ arsenal; and 
without any significant structural change to the Crummey mecha-
nism itself, the federal fisc will continue to watch as large chunks of 
potential estate tax revenue are siphoned away, $11,000 at a time.  
II.   OVERVIEW OF THE ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 
 First enacted in 1916, the federal estate tax was intended to serve 
a two-fold purpose. In addition to the fundamental goal of raising 
revenue, it was hoped that the imposition of the estate tax would 
break up large concentrations of wealth. Although some have argued 
that the estate tax has failed on both counts,4 its presence nonethe-
less continues to be a major target of disdain and abuse. 
 Despite imposition of the estate tax in 1916, taxpayers were rela-
tively unaffected by the tax, for it was easily avoided by gift transfers 
made during one’s life. To correct this formidable loophole, Congress 
enacted the gift tax in 1932. As the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee and the Senate Finance Committee aptly explained: 
The gift tax will supplement both the estate tax and the income 
tax. It will tend to reduce the incentive to make gifts in order that 
distribution of future income from the donated property may be to 
a number of persons with the result that the taxes imposed by the 
higher brackets of the income tax law are avoided. It will also tend 
to discourage transfers for the purpose of avoiding the estate tax.5 
                                                                                                                    
 2. 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 3. See infra Section V. 
 4. Robert B. Smith, Should We Give Away the Annual Exclusion?, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 
361, 368-69 (1993). 
 5. H.R. REP. NO. 72-708 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (part 2) 457, 477; S. REP. 
NO. 72-665 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (part 2) 496, 525. 
2003]                             NAKED CRUMMEY POWERS 925 
 
In practice, the federal gift tax was established to provide a “safety 
net” for the estate tax.6 To prevent taxpayers from depleting their es-
tates prior to death, thereby considerably reducing their estate tax 
liability, the gift tax, subject to certain limitations, imposes a tax 
upon all transfers or gifts, whether “direct or indirect, and whether 
the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible.”7 
 Notwithstanding the enactment of the gift tax, significant advan-
tages remained available to taxpayers who chose to use inter-vivos 
transfers to convey their estate to third parties. Initially, the gift tax 
was levied using a completely different schedule than the estate tax 
(set at roughly three-fourths the estate tax maximum)8 and was tax-
exclusive while the estate tax remained tax-inclusive.9 Most impor-
tant, for the purposes of this Comment, the gift tax contained an an-
nual exclusion provision that allowed donors to make tax-free, inter-
vivos transfers, while the estate tax contained no such provision, 
thereby providing considerable incentive for taxpayers to “gift away” 
their estates during their lifetime. 
 In an attempt to remove the preferences within the gift tax that 
served to thwart the purpose and utility of the estate tax, Congress 
adopted a unified transfer tax system in 1976.10 As part of this 
unified transfer tax system, Congress enacted the Unified Credit 
against the estate tax.11 Intended to mitigate some of the exposure 
faced by small and medium-sized estates subject to the estate tax,12 
the Unified Credit serves to remove most taxpayers from the reach of 
both the estate and gift taxes. Under the current Unified Credit, the 
first $1,000,000 of estate property ($2,000,000 for married couples) is 
                                                                                                                    
 6. See Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330, 338 (1984) (holding that “one of the major 
purposes of the federal gift tax statute [is to protect] the estate tax and the income tax”). 
 7. I.R.C. § 2511(a) (2002). 
 8. John G. Steinkamp, Common Sense and the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion, 72 NEB. 
L. REV. 106, 111 (1993). 
 9. Id. The tax-exclusive/tax-inclusive distinction, although subtle, nonetheless cre-
ates an inherent advantage to those taxpayers who choose to transfer wealth during their 
life as opposed to at their death. As a tax-inclusive levy, the estate tax is imposed upon the 
total amount of the decedent’s gross estate (including those assets used to pay the tax). 
Whereas, the gift tax, which is tax-exclusive, is imposed only upon those assets transferred 
to a beneficiary, and not upon the assets used to pay the tax. For example, assuming a flat 
transfer tax of 50 percent, if Wyatt were to make an inter-vivos transfer of $1,000,000 to 
his brother Chet, the gift tax would be imposed on the amount that Chet received after the 
tax was applied (50% of $500,000) thereby giving Chet a net gift of $750,000. On the other 
hand, if Wyatt were to wait and transfer that same amount at his death, the estate tax 
would be imposed on the $1,000,000 before it is transferred to Chet (50% of $1,000,000) 
thus leaving Chet with a net transfer of only $500,000.  See IRA MARK BLOOM ET AL., FED-
ERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, TRUSTS AND GIFTS § 2.03 (3d ed. 2002). 
 10. Smith, supra note 4, at 375-77. 
 11. I.R.C. § 2010 (2002). 
 12. Id. Currently, the Unified Credit under I.R.C. § 2010 is set at $1,000,000. How-
ever, that amount is set for a phased increase up to $3,500,000 by 2009.  I.R.C. § 2010(c) 
(2002). 
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exempted from the estate tax.13 Despite the imposition of the unified 
transfer tax system, limitations and loopholes remained abundant, 
thereby affording the savvy taxpayer ample opportunities to gift 
away their estate free from gift taxation, and reduce their subse-
quent estate tax burden in the process. 
 One of the more obvious limitations on the reach of the gift tax is 
the exclusion that applies to payments made by a taxpayer to satisfy 
the education or medical expenses of another.14 This exclusion does 
not require that the taxpayer and beneficiary have any specific rela-
tionship; nor is there any limitation on the amount that may be ex-
empt from taxation when used for the specific purposes outlined in 
section 2503(e). Further, the removal of these “basic needs” from the 
reach of the gift tax effectively increased the value of the annual ex-
clusion for those taxpayers who had previously exhausted their 
available annual exclusion to meet the financial needs of their adult 
children in school and/or elderly parents or relatives in need of medi-
cal care.15 
III.   OVERVIEW OF THE ANNUAL EXCLUSION 
 Although the stated purpose of the gift tax was to prevent estate 
tax avoidance, the taxation of all gifts, no matter how inconsequen-
tial or small, would certainly prove unduly burdensome to the aver-
age taxpayer. To avoid that result, Congress enacted an annual ex-
clusion to the gift tax: 
[t]o obviate the necessity of keeping an account of and reporting 
numerous small gifts, and, on the other [hand], to fix the amount 
sufficiently large to cover in most cases wedding and Christmas 
gifts and occasional gifts of relatively small amounts.16 
The rationale behind this exclusion is rather basic: If the government 
required every small, customary gift (i.e., Christmas, birthday, etc.) 
to be accounted for and subsequently taxed, massive noncompliance 
and collection problems would result, thereby eroding the credibility 
of the voluntary tax system as a whole.17 
 Originally set at $5,000 per donee, per year in 1932, the annual 
exclusion was later reduced to $4,000 in 1939, and $3,000 in 1942.18 
The exclusion remained at $3,000 until 1981, when Congress enacted 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) which, in one fell swoop, in-
                                                                                                                    
 13. Id. 
 14. See I.R.C. § 2503(e) (2002); Steinkamp, supra note 8, at 116. 
 15. Steinkamp, supra note 8, at 116. 
 16. S. REP. NO. 72-665, at 41 (1932); accord H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 29 (1932). 
 17. See Steinkamp, supra note 8, at 118. 
 18. Id. at 118-19. 
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creased the exclusion to $10,000.19 The legislative history behind the 
reductions of the annual exclusion in 1939 and 1942 indicate Con-
gressional concern that taxpayers could use the exclusion as a device 
to transfer significant portions of their estate free from the reach of 
the estate and gift taxes. Thus, the reduction of the exclusion amount 
in those years was intended to maintain the exclusion at a level that 
kept with the spirit behind its original enactment, without allowing 
taxpayers to avoid the estate tax with sizeable annual tax-free gifts 
given to heirs and potential beneficiaries. Given the legislative his-
tory behind the original passage of the annual exclusion in 1932, and 
the subsequent reductions in 1939 and 1942, it is relatively clear that 
Congress did not intend for the annual exclusion to be used as an es-
tate-planning tool. Rather, from its inception, the annual exclusion 
was designed as nothing more than a means of reducing the potential 
administrative burden and taxpayer discontent associated with the 
accounting and taxation of the most basic, everyday gift transfers. 
A.   Present Interest Requirement 
 Because Congress intended for the annual exclusion to cover only 
minor, routine gifts, which are customarily transfers of present in-
terests, it follows that the exclusion “does not apply with respect to a 
gift to any donee to whom is given a future interest.”20 Whether or 
not a given transfer will qualify under the exclusion is often deter-
mined by how the Service will characterize the transfer: If the trans-
fer is deemed a “present interest,” the annual exclusion will apply; if 
a “future interest,” the exclusion will not be applicable and the tax-
payer must pay gift tax on the transfer.  
 The present interest requirement arose out of concern over the 
applicability and abuse of the exclusion. On the one hand, Congress 
recognized the potential difficulty that could arise in “determining 
the number of eventual donees and the value of their respective 
gifts”21 if gifts of future interest were allowed to qualify for the exclu-
sion. More importantly, by limiting the exclusion to only present in-
terest transfers, Congress intended to ensure that its use would ap-
ply only to those transfers it was originally meant to cover—routine, 
ordinary gifts.22 However, when using the exclusion as an estate-
planning tool, taxpayers often “double dip” by using the full amount 
                                                                                                                    
 19. See Smith, supra note 4, at 383-86. Currently, the rate established under section 
2503(b) has been indexed for inflation and is now set at $11,000. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2002). 
 20. S. REP. NO. 665-72 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 496, 526; H.R. REP. NO. 708-
72 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 457, 478. 
 21. S. REP. NO. 665-72 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 496, 526; H.R. REP. NO. 708-
72 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 457, 478. 
 22. Given this, it is rather apparent that Congress did not intend for the annual ex-
clusion to be used as an estate planning device. 
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of their exclusion for estate planning purposes, while at the same 
time giving those same beneficiaries the normal, everyday gifts 
meant to be covered by the exclusion.23 This practice is a clear sub-
version of the intent behind the exclusion, and is exacerbated by the 
use of family members in Crummey trust situations (who are most 
likely to receive the normal, ordinary gifts meant to be covered by the 
exclusion). 
 Despite the importance placed upon the characterization of the 
transfer, neither “future interest” nor “present interest” are defined 
in the Internal Revenue Code. Treasury Regulations have defined 
“future interest” as “includ[ing] reversions, remainders, and other in-
terests or estates, whether vested or contingent, and whether or not 
supported by a particular interest or estate, which [is] limited to 
commence in use, possession, or enjoyment at some future date or 
time.”24 However, courts have interpreted the distinction between 
present and future interests in a manner that is vague and contra-
dictory, thereby leaving the taxpayer without a consensus as to what 
truly qualifies as a future interest for the purpose of the annual ex-
clusion.  
 In most situations, the distinction between whether an interest is 
considered “present” or “future” for purposes of the annual exclusion 
is directly correlated to the type of interest transferred to the donee. 
For example, outright gifts of property will almost always be consid-
ered transfers of present interest because the beneficiary is given the 
ability to immediately enjoy the gift. In contrast, transfers in trust 
are almost always intended to provide for a beneficiary’s future wel-
fare, and often contain restrictions that strictly prohibit a benefici-
ary’s immediate enjoyment of the gift.25 Thus, a transfer in trust will 
                                                                                                                    
 23. Smith, supra note 4, at 394-95; see infra Section VIII.A. 
 24. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (as amended in 1983). 
 25. One exception to this rule are gifts made in trust for the benefit of a minor that 
meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 2503(c). Under I.R.C. § 2503(c), transfers made in trust 
will be considered present interests, and therefore subject to the annual exclusion, so long 
as: (1) the trust is limited to a single beneficiary under the age of twenty-one, and the trus-
tee must be authorized to use the trust income and principal for the benefit of the minor 
beneficiary during his minority; (2) upon reaching age twenty-one, any portion of the trust 
corpus not expended during the beneficiary’s minority must be distributed to the benefici-
ary in full upon turning twenty-one; and (3) if the minor dies before reaching age twenty-
one, the trust property is distributable to the minor beneficiary’s estate, or to whomever he 
appoints the property to under a general power of appointment. I.R.C. § 2503(c) (2002); 
Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4 (a) (1958).  Although I.R.C. § 2503(c) would seem to alleviate the 
need for Crummey powers, the transaction costs associated with creating a 2503(c) trust 
(e.g., separate trusts for each beneficiary), coupled with a beneficiary’s right to absolute 
control over the entire trust corpus upon turning twenty-one, renders use of 2503(c) im-
practical when viewed in terms of the estate-planning goals of Crummey grantors.  See 
Smith, supra note 4, at 391 (“Because the donor can control how property transferred into 
trust is used by selecting the trustee and trust terms, [Crummey] withdrawal rights en-
courage use of the annual exclusion to make transfers of property in a way that does not 
really give the donee control.”).   
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generally be treated as a future interest for the purpose of qualifying 
for the annual exclusion.26 Beyond the two previous examples, what 
will and will not qualify as a present interest for the exclusion is of-
ten determined by the amount of control that a donee exercises over 
the transferred property.  
 In Fondren v. Commissioner,27 the United States Supreme Court 
established that determination of a present interest for the annual 
exclusion is:  
[A] question . . . of time, not when title vests, but when enjoyment 
begins. Whatever puts the barrier of a substantial period between 
the will of the beneficiary or donee now to enjoy what has been 
given him . . . that enjoyment makes the gift one of a future inter-
est within the meaning of the regulation.28  
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Kieckhefer v. Commissioner,29 left 
no room for discretion when it established that it is not the actual en-
joyment of an interest “which marks the dividing line between a pre-
sent and future interest, but it is the right conferred upon the benefi-
ciary to such use, possession or enjoyment.”30 
 The best way to illustrate the subtle distinctions that often sepa-
rate present from future interests is through example. If a benefici-
ary were to receive an annual income interest from the principal of a 
trust, it will likely be considered a present interest (and therefore 
qualify as a valid 2503(b) exclusion) under both Fondren and Kieck-
hefer because the beneficiary’s right to demand immediate payment 
of that income interest is absolute. However, in an extreme example, 
if the same beneficiary was held hostage in a Chinese prison camp, 
then it can be said that a “barrier of a substantial period between the 
will of the beneficiary” and his enjoyment of that income interest31 
has been created by way of the beneficiary’s unfortunate incarcera-
tion. Under Fondren, the once-present interest must now be charac-
terized as a future interest, and thus is not subject to the annual ex-
clusion.32 Nevertheless, according to Kieckhefer, this unlikely sce-
nario does nothing to the actual “right” conferred upon the benefici-
ary to use, possess, or enjoy the income interest (aside from the fact 
that it is difficult to withdraw money from a trust from within a 
bamboo cage on the other side of the globe). In turn, so long as that 
“right” stays intact, the transfer will remain a present interest and 
                                                                                                                    
 26. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(c), ex.2 (as amended 1983); Phillips v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 
216 (1949); Rev. Rul. 79-47, 1979-1 C.B. 312. 
 27. 324 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1945). 
 28. Id. (citation omitted). 
 29. 189 F.2d 118, 121 (1951). 
 30. Id.  
 31. See Fondren, 324 U.S. at 20-21. 
 32. See id. 
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qualify for the annual exclusion.33 
 Most taxpayers do not want to have to make outright gifts in or-
der to qualify for the annual exclusion. Because minors are the most 
likely target for lifetime gifting,34 it is understandable that the donor 
in such a situation would want to maintain some control over the 
property to ensure that the funds are not wasted on youthful eccen-
tricities. For this reason, gifts in trust are extremely useful to donors, 
in that they allow the donor to retain some control (via a dependable 
trustee and good tax advisor) over how the funds are managed and 
subsequently released.35  
 Yet despite this apparent advantage to giving gifts in trust, a two-
fold problem remains: First, gifts in trust are almost always consid-
ered transfers of future interest and therefore fail to qualify for the 
annual exclusion; and second, because these gifts are considered fu-
ture interests, the funds will be subject to the gift tax when distrib-
uted to the trust. However, if a taxpayer is somehow able to 
characterize a gift in trust as a present interest, the taxpayer can 
take advantage of the annual exclusion, avoid both estate and gift 
taxation on the amount transferred,36 and maintain control over how 
the property is managed. But how, près tell, can this be done? The 
answer lies in Crummey. 
IV.   HOW DOES A CRUMMEY POWER WORK? 
 As mentioned earlier,37 a Crummey trust allows a taxpayer to 
maintain control over a gift (through a retention of power granted in 
the trust instrument itself),38 while qualifying the gift as a present 
                                                                                                                    
 33. Fondren and Kieckhefer represent only some of the subtle judicial distinctions be-
tween present and future interests. 
 34. Oftentimes, individuals will gift away most of their estates during their lifetime 
in an attempt to avoid the penal nature of the estate tax. See I.R.C. § 2001(c)(1) (2002). 
 35. In order for a gift in trust to be excluded from a donor’s estate at death, the gift 
must be deemed “complete.” See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (as amended in 1999). A com-
pleted gift is one where the donor has relinquished all dominion and control over the prop-
erty transferred. See id. If the donor retains any interest whatsoever (no matter how 
small), that transfer will be considered incomplete, and the property will be included in the 
donor’s estate upon death. Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393, 396 (1941); Rev. Rul. 67-
396, 1967-2 C.B. 351, clarified by Rev. Rul. 84-25, 1984-1 C.B. 191. 
 36. This is still subject to the $11,000 cap on the annual exclusion in section 2503(b), 
as well as the “five or five” limitation under I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(2), 2514(c). Under I.R.C. § 
2041(b)(2), a beneficiary, upon lapse, is deemed to have released the general power of ap-
pointment granted to him via the Crummey power on any withdrawal amount greater 
than $5000 or five percent of the trust corpus. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) (2002). 
 37. See supra Section III. 
 38. There are many different ways that a donor may retain an interest over the trust 
corpus. For instance, a donor may preserve the power to add and remove beneficiaries of a 
trust at will or maintain power over the management of the funds kept in trust. Ulti-
mately, the methods by which a donor may retain control over a Crummey trust, and still 
qualify for the annual exclusion, are virtually limitless. 
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interest, thereby allowing the taxpayer to utilize the annual exclu-
sion. To accomplish this estate planning “two-step,” the donor estab-
lishes a trust (usually in the name of the intended beneficiaries); and 
in each year that the exclusion is sought, confers upon the donee a 
lapsing power to withdraw a specified amount (usually up to either 
the “5 or 5” limitation, or the annual exclusion amount—whichever is 
greater). Simply granting the beneficiary the lapsing right to with-
draw only gets the donor to the dance floor. To perform the “two-
step” properly, the beneficiary must allow the power to lapse, thereby 
allowing the gift to revert to the trust and the donor to take the an-
nual exclusion. If, however, the donee were to exercise his/her power 
to withdraw, the music stops and the purpose of the transaction is 
thwarted because the funds do not revert to the trust, but rather into 
the immediate possession of the beneficiary. Although the donor in 
such a situation does not lose the ability to claim the annual exclu-
sion, any significant control over the funds is lost to “youthful eccen-
tricities.”39 
 So, how does a donor ensure that the withdrawal right is not exer-
cised? An easy answer is to simply not inform the potential 
beneficiary that they have a right to begin with. After all, you cannot 
demand what you do not know exists.40 Another potential method to 
ensure non-exercise is to make the demand period so unreasonably 
short that a beneficiary could not exercise his right even if he wanted 
to.41 To combat these types of abuse, the IRS, in numerous post-
Crummey private letter rulings,42 established that a beneficiary must 
be given proper, written notice and a reasonable opportunity to exer-
cise his demand right (thirty days or more). 
 Even with proper notice and opportunity to exercise, donors may 
nonetheless control the situation through an agreement, either ex-
press or implied, that makes certain the beneficiary will not exercise 
his demand power. Within the context of these “lapse agreements” 
lies the crux of the Crummey problem from the viewpoint of both the 
                                                                                                                    
 39. See supra Section III. 
 40. Prior to Revenue Ruling 81-7, it was common for a beneficiary to never receive no-
tice of his right to withdraw. See Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968) (ad-
mitting that some, if not all, of the beneficiaries of the trust had no idea that they had a 
demand power). Cf. Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474.  
 41. See Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474 (establishing a minimum period for a demand 
right to remain available to a beneficiary in order for the “transfer” amount to be excluded 
from the grantor’s estate under I.R.C. § 2503(b)). 
 42. Id. In Revenue Ruling 81-7, the IRS addressed a trust that granted an adult bene-
ficiary a demand right scheduled to lapse on December 31. Id. However, the donor did not 
make the actual gift until two days prior to the lapse (December 29) and failed to notify the 
beneficiary regarding the existence of the power until after the demand period had expired. 
Id. As a result, the IRS deemed the power to be “illusory,” and refused to recognize the 
transfer as a present interest and the annual exclusion was denied. See id. 
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Service43 and the courts.44 If the donor and beneficiary have a prear-
ranged agreement to allow the demand power to lapse, then the 
power is “illusory” and the annual exclusion should be denied.45 How-
ever, since these arrangements are informal, and often implied, their 
existence is very difficult to prove with any degree of objectivity.46 
V.   PRE-CRUMMEY PRECEDENT—NON-LAPSING DEMAND POWERS 
 One of the most significant and oft-cited cases dealing with de-
mand powers and the annual exclusion is the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Fondren v. Commissioner.47 In Fondren, the Court 
was faced with the question of whether taxpayers who had estab-
lished seven separate trusts for their seven infant grandchildren, 
could exclude the first $5000 of contributions made to each trust in 
the years 1935, 1936, and 1937.48 To the extent that no present inter-
est is given to a beneficiary, gifts to an irrevocable trust are future 
interests, and thus cannot be excluded. However, the taxpayers in 
Fondren argued that the withdrawal power given to the trustee to 
distribute funds from the trust corpus to provide for the support, 
education, and maintenance of the beneficiaries on the basis of need49 
was sufficient to establish that the beneficiaries had, at the moment 
of each gift, a present right of enjoyment.50 The Fondren Court ac-
knowledged that the exclusion cannot apply simply because the 
“donee has vested rights.”51 Rather, the donee must receive a “right 
to [a] substantial present economic benefit,” as determined by the 
present right to “use, possess or enjoy the property,” in order for the 
exclusion to apply.52 Furthermore, the Court took special note of the 
language in the trust instrument which explicitly stated that the do-
nor did not foresee the trustee having to invade the income or corpus 
of the trust because the beneficiaries already had “adequate and suf-
ficient means of support.”53 The Court recognized that the “circum-
stances surrounding the donors and the donees . . . made enjoyment 
[of the gifts] contingent upon the occurrence of future events, not 
only uncertain, but by the recitals of the instrument itself improbable 
of occurrence.”54 Consequently, the Court in Fondren found that the 
                                                                                                                    
 43. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-31-004 (Aug. 1, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-28-004 (July 
12, 1996); Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-003 (Mar. 16, 1987). 
 44. See infra note 143. 
 45. Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474. 
 46. See infra Sections VIII.E, IX.D. 
 47. 324 U.S. 18 (1945). 
 48. Id. at 19-20. 
 49. Id. at 22-23. 
 50. Id. at 24. 
 51. Id. at 20. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 23. 
 54. Id. at 24. 
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circumstances surrounding the creation of the trust, coupled with the 
language of the trust itself, ultimately rendered the withdrawal 
power unlikely to be exercised. Thus the gifts were considered future 
interests and, therefore, non-excludable.55 
 Despite the Supreme Court’s recognition that surrounding cir-
cumstances were to be considered in determining the probability of 
withdrawal,56 the circuit courts remained split on whether to accept 
such a test. For instance, the Seventh Circuit in Kieckhefer v. Com-
missioner57 recognized that the court should not look beyond the “‘ex-
plicit terms of the trust’”58 to determine whether there exist sufficient 
“conditions and restrictions”59 to establish that the donee had not re-
ceived a present interest gift. The court focused upon the distinction 
between restrictions and contingencies that are imposed by the donor 
via the trust itself, and those that result from the incapacity of the 
beneficiary as a minor.60 Ultimately, the Kieckhefer court found that 
if the restrictions that prevent withdrawal are imposed by law (as is 
the case with minority), that is not enough to transform a present in-
terest into a future interest. Out of the same concern for reliability 
and administrative convenience, many courts, including the Ninth 
Circuit in Crummey,61 used a similarly simple and predictable Kieck-
hefer-like approach to deal with the muddled distinction between 
present and future interests as applied to donee withdrawal rights.62 
                                                                                                                    
 55. Id. at 29. In a related case, Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945), the 
Court was faced with a trust problem similar to Fondren and subsequently decided the 
case in favor of the Service using the same surrounding circumstances test used in Fon-
dren. See Fondren, 324 U.S. at 24. 
 56. See Fondren, 324 U.S. at 24. 
 57. 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951). The taxpayer in Kieckhefer established a trust for 
the benefit of his grandson (a minor) and named his son (the father of the beneficiary) as 
trustee. The trust instrument provided that the beneficiary could demand any or all of the 
trust estate at any time through his father (the trustee) or a legal guardian. The taxpayer 
sought to claim an exclusion for the initial gift made to the trust. The case ultimately 
hinged upon two questions: First, could the beneficiary (an infant at the time the trust was 
created) really make an effective demand? Second, will the fact that no legal guardian was 
appointed to the child at the time of the trust effectively hinder the beneficiaries’ ability to 
make a demand so that the transfers will be considered future interests? 
 58. Id. at 120. 
 59. Id. 
 60. The court noted that the Service’s argument—the fact that no guardian had yet 
been appointed who could transform the gift into a future interest—was fallacious due to 
“the [Service’s] failure to distinguish between restrictions and contingencies imposed by 
the donor (in this case the trust instrument), and such restrictions and contingencies as 
are due to disabilities always incident to and associated with minors and other incompe-
tents.” Id. at 122. 
 61. See Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 62. See Dora Arash, Crummey Trusts: An Exploitation of the Annual Exclusion, 21 
PEPP. L. REV. 83 (1993). 
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 However, not all courts were willing to sacrifice reality for “‘sim-
plicity and predictability.’”63 Most notably, the Second Circuit in 
Stifel v. Commissioner64 closely followed the approach taken by the 
Supreme Court in Fondren65 and Commissioner v. Disston,66 noting 
that “the Court, in reaching its determinations, did not irrevocably 
lock itself inside the ‘four corners’ of the writings [of the trust] but 
held that the key might lie outside.”67 The court clairvoyantly warned 
that if the surrounding circumstances were not considered, “a donor 
could make gifts which on paper were 100% present but in practice 
were 100% future.”68 In turn, the Stifel court found that because the 
minor beneficiaries of the trust had not been appointed guardians 
through whom they could legally exercise their withdrawal rights, 
their power to make a demand was impractical, thereby making the 
withdrawal rights future interests, rather than excludible present in-
terests.69 
VI.   CRUMMEY V. COMMISSIONER—THE LAPSING DEMAND POWER 
 The most significant of the circuit court decisions dealing with 
characterization of demand powers for the purpose of annual exclu-
sion was handed down by the Ninth Circuit in Crummey v. Commis-
sioner.70 The dispute in Crummey revolved around the creation of a 
trust instrument that provided that each of the four beneficiaries71 
could demand, at any time up until December 31st of that year, up to 
$4,000, or the amount transferred into trust in that year, whichever 
was less.72 What made Crummey different from the cases previously 
                                                                                                                    
 63. Id. at 98 (quoting Jeffery G. Sherman, ‘Tis a Gift to be Simple: The Need for a New 
Definition of “Future Interests” for Gift Tax Purposes, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 585, 589 (1987)). 
 64. 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 65. Fondren v. Comm’r, 324 U.S. 18 (1945). 
 66. 325 U.S. 442 (1945). 
 67. Stifel, 197 F.2d at 110. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 110-11. The court, in dicta, noted that “it would then seem to be proper to 
consider the actual facts as to the father’s influence on the guardian appointed” to deter-
mine whether the child was given a legitimate right to exercise their demand power or not. 
Id. at 110 n.5. One can logically infer that if a parent allows their power to lapse, inevita-
bly they will do the same for their child. Thus, the benefit that is said to inure to the child 
is never actually realized by the child because the decision to exercise has been predeter-
mined by their parent’s decision to allow lapse to occur. If you grant an exclusion based 
upon the demand power given to these children, that right merely serves as a vehicle for 
multiplying the number of annual exclusions given to the parents because the powers are 
“conferred” upon the parent, not only for their own share, but for the share of their chil-
dren as well. In turn, donors are thus able to mitigate the potential for any “strays” that 
may exercise their powers, because the Crummey powers are essentially consolidated into 
the hands of a few. See infra Section VIII.E. 
 70. 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 71. At the time the trust was created, the ages of the four beneficiaries were twenty-
two, twenty, fifteen, and eleven years-old. 
 72. Id. at 83. 
2003]                             NAKED CRUMMEY POWERS 935 
 
discussed73 was that the demand power granted to the beneficiaries 
did not continue for the life of the trust, but rather, lapsed at the end 
of each year it was given. Thus, by virtue of the trust language that 
afforded the beneficiaries the right to compel immediate distribution 
of the trust funds within a specified period of time, the taxpayer in 
Crummey claimed that under Kieckhefer74 the transfers were gifts of 
present interest, and therefore qualified for the annual exclusion.75 
The IRS countered that the demand rights granted to the minor chil-
dren, in light of the surrounding circumstances,76 were not likely to 
be exercised, and thus the transfer could not constitute a present in-
terest.77 
 In wrestling with how to characterize a lapsing demand power, 
the Ninth Circuit in Crummey opted for a middle ground between the 
Kieckhefer approach urged by the taxpayer, and the Stifel test argued 
by the Service. Closely following the 1956 Tax Court decision of Per-
kins v. Commissioner,78 the Ninth Circuit determined that “all that is 
necessary [for the exclusion to apply] is to find that the demand could 
not be [legally] resisted.”79 Using this “right to enjoy”80 criterion, the 
Crummey court found that the lapsing demand powers given to the 
beneficiaries in 1962 and 1963, although never exercised, “could not 
be [legally] resisted”81 and thus the taxpayers were entitled to the 
annual exclusion for the gifts made to the four beneficiaries in both 
years at issue.82 In its reasoning, the Crummey court rejected the ap-
proach taken by the IRS (relying on Stifel83) and established that 
whether or not a guardian had been expressly appointed by the donor 
has no relevance to the application of the annual exclusion, so long as 
the “demand power was valid and enforceable.”84 
                                                                                                                    
 73. See supra Section V. 
 74. See Kieckhefer v. Comm’r, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951) (holding that so long as 
the explicit terms of the trust afford a beneficiary a present right to receive income from a 
trust, that alone is enough to establish a present interest gift). 
 75. Crummey, 397 F.2d at 84-85. 
 76. The IRS noted that no guardian had been appointed to make the demand for the 
minor beneficiaries thereby transforming the demand power into a non-excludible gift of 
future interest. Id. 
 77. The IRS relied heavily upon Stifel to make this point. See Stifel v. Comm’r, 197 
F.2d 107 (2d Cir 1952). 
 78. 27 T.C. 601 (1956). 
 79. Crummey, 397 F.2d at 88. 
 80. See Gilmore v. Comm’r, 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1954). 
 81. Crummey, 397 F.2d at 88. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Stifel v. Comm’r, 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 84. Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Emperor Does Not Need New Clothes—The Expanding 
Use of “Naked” Crummey Withdrawal Powers to Obtain Federal Gift Tax Annual Exclu-
sions, 73 TUL. L. REV. 555, 573 (1998). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit tacitly repudiated the 
Kieckhefer test by declining to acknowledge that postponed enjoyment due only to the mi-
nority of a beneficiary will nevertheless be considered a present interest. See Crummey, 
397 F.2d at 88; Kieckhefer v. Comm’r, 189 F.2d 118, 119 (7th Cir. 1951). 
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 The Crummey court expressly declined to even entertain the IRS 
argument that the likelihood of the beneficiary’s demand should be 
considered when determining whether the transfer is a present or fu-
ture interest.85 In doing so, the court noted the inconsistency and un-
fairness to the taxpayer that could result from the IRS implementing 
such an approach due to the arbitrary nature of trying to interpret 
the subjective intent behind each decision to allow a demand power 
to lapse.86 Ultimately, the court opted for the lesser of two evils, and 
determined that predictability for all taxpayers was of greater impor-
tance than the risk of occasional estate tax avoidance. 
A.   Public Policy Rationale for Crummey Decision 
 Despite what has become of Crummey today,87 there nevertheless 
exists a sound policy rationale for the Ninth Circuit’s decision. The 
desire to provide for one’s offspring in the future is a time-honored 
and sacred human instinct throughout all levels of society. Often, the 
estate and gift taxes present a significant (but necessary) roadblock 
to an individual’s realization of this cherished human goal. In some 
cases, the estate tax can mean the difference between truly providing 
for one’s offspring in the future, and merely supplying a temporary 
windfall. With that in mind, the Ninth Circuit sought to level the 
playing field between taxpayers who did not have secondary concerns 
over their beneficiaries (i.e., beneficiaries who can be trusted to con-
trol the funds given to them),88 and taxpayers with beneficiaries who 
cannot be trusted to effectively manage the gift in the same manner 
as beneficiaries without secondary concerns.89 By allowing donors to 
                                                                                                                    
 85. Crummey, 397 F.2d at 87. The court went so far as to acknowledge that some, if 
not all, of the beneficiaries had no idea that they had the right to demand funds from the 
trust, and therefore it was “highly unlikely that a demand [would] ever be made” at all. Id. 
 86. Id. at 88. 
 87. The use of Crummey trusts as an estate planning tool has become a firmly en-
trenched in the tax planning arena largely because the IRS has failed to wage a significant 
attack upon the abusive uses of Crummey. See generally Fogel, supra note 84 (arguing that 
the Service’s treatment of Crummey has been inconsistent and ineffective largely because 
of their insistence on taking a piecemeal approach of attacking only those decisions that 
expanded Crummey powers, rather than attacking the use of lapsing withdrawal powers 
on the basis of the Crummey decision itself). 
 88. The term “secondary concerns” is generally meant to encompass those situations 
where the donor is unable to freely make outright gifts to the beneficiary due to the fact 
that the beneficiary cannot be trusted to effectively manage the funds by virtue of the 
beneficiary’s minority or other incapacity. On the other hand, those donors who wish to 
provide for beneficiaries without secondary concerns are free to transfer their estate to 
their intended beneficiary via outright gift and qualify for the annual exclusion, because 
those beneficiaries can be trusted to look after their own best interest in managing the 
funds. 
 89. Prior to Crummey, a taxpayer with minor children had only three routes to take: 
(1) make a complete gift in trust for the beneficiary (in which case the donor must relin-
quish total control over management of the funds to qualify for the annual exclusion—a 
risky proposition when your child’s future well-being is at stake); (2) make an incomplete 
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utilize the lapsing demand power to establish a present interest gift, 
the Crummey court remedied the inequity faced by taxpayers with 
young children.90 To take advantage of the annual exclusion prior to 
Crummey, these taxpayers had to either relinquish control over the 
funds meant to provide for their children’s future support, or wait 
until those children were mature enough to manage those funds on 
their own. Thus, after Crummey, taxpayers were finally afforded a 
mechanism by which they could make a gift to trust for the benefit of 
a minor child, maintain some control over the funds in trust (through 
the language in the trust instrument), and still claim the transfer 
under the annual exclusion.  
 When framed in this manner, Crummey can certainly be seen as 
having served an important and justifiable policy goal. However, 
with the benefit of hindsight, it is now fairly obvious that the court in 
Crummey may have misconstrued the vastness of the beast it had 
unleashed. Although the policy behind Crummey was sound, the 
mechanism left behind was broad and pliable, thereby affording tax 
planners a significant amount of “wiggle room” with which the estate 
and gift tax could be avoided by means never envisioned by the Ninth 
Circuit. As a result, the Crummey power has become an effective es-
tate-planning tool that affords taxpayers the ability to legally and 
systematically drain the value of their estates while side-stepping 
both estate and gift tax consequences on the amount transferred. 
B.   Naked and Semi-Naked Crummey Powers 
 The discussion thus far has operated under the assumption that 
the beneficiary of a withdrawal right maintains an interest in that 
right, even after lapse, because they have a vested interest in the 
trust corpus to which the demand right has reverted as a result of 
the lapse. Thus, one can logically presume that a beneficiary may re-
fuse to exercise the demand power and take the money immediately 
                                                                                                                    
gift in trust for the child (whereby the parent maintains control over the management of 
the funds, but is denied the annual exclusion and the funds are included in the donor’s es-
tate at death); or (3) simply hold on to the money and manage it themselves (in which case 
the funds are subject to the estate tax at the donor’s death). 
 90. Leaving such a responsibility in the hands of another (even if a trusted fiduciary 
with strict guidelines) is a “dicey” proposition for any parent. In turn, it can be inferred 
that the Ninth Circuit’s purpose was to limit its remedy to the problem before it, and not to 
create a mechanism by which individuals could utilize the annual exclusion through laps-
ing demand powers given to beneficiaries with a remote contingent interest in the trust 
corpus. See infra Section VII. 
 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Crummey implicitly recognized the need for parents to main-
tain control over the funds to be used for their children’s future, especially in those cases 
where the children are relatively young and cannot be expected to manage the funds in a 
responsible manner. 
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knowing that the gift is not lost, but postponed until the trust is pay-
able to him.91  
 However, the same logic does not follow when the beneficiary of a 
demand power does not have any interest in the trust outside of the 
Crummey power, but nevertheless allows the withdrawal right to 
lapse. In such a situation, the beneficiary retains what is commonly 
referred to as a “naked” Crummey power,92 that is, a lapsing demand 
right without any corresponding interest in the corpus of the trust. 
With naked Crummey powers, the beneficiary has no conceivable 
economic incentive to allow a lapse to occur because once the demand 
power has lapsed, the income from that demand right is gone for-
ever.93 Given this, it logically follows that the beneficiary of a naked 
Crummey power will not allow the lapse to occur, and thus the trans-
fer will amount to nothing more than an outright gift, thereby afford-
ing the grantor with none of the estate-planning benefits normally 
associated with a Crummey power.94 Yet, if a grantor could somehow 
ensure that a naked Crummey beneficiary will not exercise their de-
mand right, then it follows that the number of annual exclusions that 
can be claimed under naked Crummey powers is limited only by the 
number of potential beneficiaries who can be entrusted to let the 
power lapse.95 Without any limitation regarding the beneficiary’s in-
terest, or lack thereof, in the trust corpus, donors can merely pick 
and choose as many beneficiaries as necessary to reduce their tax-
able estate to zero. In addition, if notice and opportunity to exercise 
were not required (as was the case prior to Revenue Ruling 81-7) 
then a donor could simply open the phone book and transfer their en-
tire estate into trust in one year without any gift tax consequences 
whatsoever. For example, assume a donor with an estate worth 
$11,000,000 has set up a trust with his only heir as the sole benefici-
ary. Without notice and opportunity to exercise, the donor can simply 
name as many naked Crummey power holders as it takes to relieve 
his estate from any estate tax consequences at his death. Any con-
cern that the donor may have over potential exercise is remedied by 
the fact that the power holders cannot exercise what they don’t know 
exists (because they never received notice). In this particular situa-
tion, the donor would simply divide $11,000 (the annual exclusion 
maximum) by the net worth of his estate (minus the unified credit 
                                                                                                                    
 91. In such a situation, a beneficiary will likely have an economically rational motive 
for allowing his power to lapse.  For instance, a beneficiary may, and often will, allow lapse 
simply because the trustee will better manage the trust property, thereby assuring the 
beneficiary a long-term source of future income. 
 92. See generally Fogel, supra note 84. The IRS has generally failed in its attempts to 
argue that naked Crummey powers are illusory. See id. 
 93. See Smith, supra note 4, at 390-91. 
 94. See supra Section IV. 
 95. See Fogel, supra note 84, at 583. 
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amount available to the donor) and the number he is left with is the 
amount of naked Crummey power holders he must name to siphon 
off his entire taxable estate in one year. Thus, if the donor were to 
die the following year, his entire estate will have passed to his sole 
heir free of any estate tax implications.96 Ultimately, the most telling 
indicator of whether or not an agreement for such assurances has 
been made is the economic motivation of the beneficiary in allowing 
the Crummey power to lapse. As explained earlier, basic economic 
rationality establishes that naked Crummey beneficiaries will not let 
their power of withdraw lapse, unless there exists some other moti-
vating factor external to economic considerations.97 
 As is the case with most areas of the law, there is a gray area be-
tween beneficiaries with an absolute, vested interest in the trust cor-
pus, and naked beneficiaries without an interest in the trust whatso-
ever. Semi-naked Crummey beneficiaries are those individuals whose 
interest in the trust corpus, external to their Crummey power, is con-
tingent upon the occurrence of some uncertain future event. Because 
the exact interest that semi-naked Crummey beneficiaries hold in 
the trust corpus is difficult to determine, so too is their motive for 
lapse. Unlike naked Crummey beneficiaries, whose motives to allow 
lapse are presumably non-economic, semi-naked beneficiaries are of-
ten motivated by a mixed bag of economic and non-economic concerns 
(which are ultimately dependant upon surrounding circumstances) 
and thus a presumption cannot be so easily reached with regard to 
their decision to lapse. Whether or not semi-naked beneficiaries deci-
sion to lapse is economically motivated, and therefore viable, is ulti-
mately dependent upon the likelihood of the contingency occurring.98  
                                                                                                                    
 96. Assuming the donor in this example has not made any prior gifts against his uni-
fied credit during his lifetime and has no other credits or deductions available to him, he 
will avoid a total estate tax liability of $4,700,800 by engaging in the naked Crummey 
transaction. 
 97. External factors can include, but are certainly not limited to: the desire to main-
tain good favor with the donor to protect the donee’s separate interests in the donor’s es-
tate, apart from the trust or demand power; intra-family pressure; and prearranged agree-
ments between the donor and donee.  See Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-27-003 (Mar. 16, 1987). 
 98. Although the Ninth Circuit in Crummey refused to engage in such a likelihood 
analysis, other courts have been willing to engage in a determination of the probability of 
contingency. Most notably, the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 
(1945), addressed this very issue when the taxpayer in that case created a trust equally di-
vided for the benefit of each of his five children, including his nineteen year-old son, who 
was given a one-half interest in the corpus of the trust. The nineteen-year-old’s interest, 
however, was held in trust until he reached forty-five, at which time he was to receive his 
entire one-half share. The trust instrument itself failed to provide for a beneficiary of the 
one-half share should the nineteen year-old fail to reach the age of forty-five. Thus, the 
Court concluded that it was too tenuous to assume that the nineteen year-old would live to 
forty-five, and as such, the gifts that comprised that half of the corpus were gifts of future 
interest and therefore did not qualify for the annual exclusion. Moreover, the trust failed to 
provide for the future beneficiary of the second half of the trust corpus. The taxpayer ar-
gued that because that portion of the trust could be invaded (up to ten percent of the cor-
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 For example, a common Crummey trust scenario will provide laps-
ing demand powers for the grantor’s children and grandchildren. Of-
ten, the children of the grantor are the sole primary beneficiaries of 
the trust, leaving the grandchildren with only a remainder interest 
contingent upon the death of their parent beneficiary before a certain 
age. Moreover, even in cases where the contingency is remote, at 
best, these transfers are made between family members with signifi-
cant economic interests external to the lapsing withdrawal power 
and the trust corpus, thereby making maintenance of good favor with 
the donor a much more valuable commodity than the relatively small 
$11,000 annual gift. In these situations there often exists an implied 
“you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” understanding between the 
grantor and beneficiary where the grantor gets the present benefit of 
the annual exclusion through the lapse, and the beneficiary main-
tains their future interest in the grantor’s estate by allowing the 
lapse. From an economic rationality standpoint, because the contin-
gency upon which these grandchildren’s interest relies is unlikely to 
occur, the grandchild, like their naked Crummey power counterparts, 
should exercise their demand power due to the fact that they will 
likely never see that money again. Assuming that a donor has five 
grandchildren, the net estate of that donor is decreased by $55,000 
annually without having to give away anything “real.” On its face, 
the $55,000 a year seems a bit paltry in the grand scheme of things. 
However, if the number of beneficiaries with semi-naked Crummey 
demand rights are increased to twenty or thirty,99 and then multi-
plied over twenty-five years; what at first blush seemed to be an in-
significant loss for the fisc, suddenly becomes quite a hemorrhage in 
estate tax revenue. 
VII.   CRISTOFANI V. COMMISSIONER: ABUSE                                                   
OF THE ANNUAL EXCLUSION 
 As discussed earlier,100 the Crummey court left tax planners with 
broad latitude to use the annual exclusion as a device to avoid the es-
tate tax.101 As such, tax planners did not disappoint, and continued to 
                                                                                                                    
pus) in cases of emergency, the beneficiaries received a present benefit thereby justifying 
the exclusion. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the mere possibility that an emer-
gency may arise was not sufficient to turn a future interest into a present interest. In the 
same vein, the mere possibility that a beneficiary could have a future interest in a trust by 
virtue of a remote contingency is not enough to allow taxpayers to utilize the Crummey 
power for the sole purpose of multiplying their tax advantage under the annual exclusion. 
 99. Anyone who grew up in an Irish-Catholic family can attest that this is a real pos-
sibility. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-41-008 (Oct. 11, 1991) (denying a donor the annual exclu-
sion who claimed exclusions for the Crummey powers held by each of her three primary 
beneficiary children and thirty-two contingent remainder grandchildren). 
 100. See supra Section VI. 
 101. Id. 
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push the limits of Crummey102 beyond its originally intended parame-
ters.103 The most significant Tax Court case to deal with the expan-
sion of the Crummey precedent104 was Cristofani v. Commissioner.105 
The controversy in Cristofani106 was centered around annual exclu-
sions claimed by Maria Cristofani for gifts made to her two children 
and five grandchildren (all minors) in 1984 and 1985. As is the case 
in a Crummey trust situation, the two children and five grandchil-
dren were each given a lapsing power to demand up to $10,000 of the 
trust income in the year it was given.107 In Cristofani, however, only 
the two children of the grantor were named as primary beneficiaries 
of the trust.108 The five grandchildren, on the other hand, retained a 
future interest in the trust only if their parent failed to outlive the 
donor by one-hundred-twenty days.109 Due to the tenuous nature of 
the Cristofani grandchildren’s contingent interest,110 the IRS refused 
to recognize the transfers made to them as gifts of present interest 
and denied the annual exclusions for all five grandchildren in both 
years in controversy.111 Relying on the definition of a present interest 
promulgated in Crummey,112 the taxpayer in Cristofani argued that, 
so long as the grandchildren’s right to demand payment “could not be 
[legally] resisted,”113 the annual exclusion should apply.114 The IRS 
countered by establishing that Crummey was inapplicable to the 
situation in Cristofani because the beneficiaries in Crummey pos-
sessed “‘substantial future economic benefits’ in the trust corpus and 
income,” while the grandchildren in Cristofani retained no such fu-
ture interest because the contingency was unlikely to occur.115 Ulti-
mately, the Cristofani court sided with the taxpayers and found that 
the demand power held by each of the grandchildren was indeed a 
present interest and therefore subject to the annual exclusion.116 
                                                                                                                    
 102. See Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 103. See supra Section VI.A. 
 104. Crummey, 397 F.2d 82. 
 105. 97 T.C. 74 (1991). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 75. The beneficiaries were only given fifteen days within which to exercise 
their demand power. Id. at 76. That is fifteen days less than the amount mandated under 
the notice requirements in Revenue Ruling 81-7. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 108. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 74. 
 109. Id. 
 110. The Cristofani court recognized the unlikelihood of the contingency ever being 
met, noting that both of the donor’s children were in good health upon her death. Id. at 83. 
 111. Id. at 78. 
 112. Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 113. See Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 80 (quoting Crummey, 397 F.2d at 88). 
 114. Id. at 80-81. 
 115. Id. at 82. 
 116. Id. at 84-85. 
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 In reaching its decision, the Cristofani court expanded the reach 
of Crummey far beyond what was contemplated by the Ninth Circuit, 
reading Crummey as follows: 
We do not believe, however, that Crummey requires that the bene-
ficiaries of a trust must have a vested present interest or vested 
remainder interest in the trust corpus or income, in order to qual-
ify for the section 2503(b) exclusion.117 
Although this seems to be a rather egregious expansion of Crummey, 
it can nevertheless be argued that the Cristofani court made its deci-
sion within the parameters of the procedural structure left by the 
Ninth Circuit. Crummey involved a trust instrument that provided: 
[W]ith the exception of the yearly demand provision, the only way 
the corpus can ever be tapped by a beneficiary, is through a distri-
bution at the discretion of the trustee.118 
If construed broadly, because the beneficiaries’ interest in the trust 
corpus was dependent upon the discretion of the trustee, then it 
would seem that Crummey too involved beneficiaries with contingent 
interests in the trust corpus, thereby opening the door for courts to 
uphold Cristofani-like abuses of the annual exclusion. However, to 
read Crummey in such a broad manner distorts the reality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the beneficiaries’ interest in the trust cor-
pus.  
 On the one hand the contingency in Crummey was predicated 
upon the discretion of a trustee, who, as a fiduciary, must give effect 
to the donor’s will (as outlined in the trust instrument). Given the 
language in the Crummey trust instrument, coupled with the legal 
obligation of a fiduciary to carry out the terms of that trust instru-
ment, it was likely, if not certain, that the beneficiaries would receive 
a share of the trust corpus at some point in the future.119 In contrast, 
the contingency in Cristofani was based upon the occurrence of an 
uncontrollable outside event (the death of both trustees within 120 
days of the death of the decedent) that, given the nature of probabili-
                                                                                                                    
 117. Id. at 83. 
 118. Crummey, 397 F.2d at 88. 
 119. The trust instrument in Crummey provided that “the trustee was authorized to 
invade the trust corpus of a beneficiary’s trust ‘up to the whole thereof’ . . . [for the] ‘proper 
care, maintenance, support and education’” of each beneficiary. Crummey v. Comm’r, 25 
T.C.M. (P-H) 144, 146 (1966). Given this language, it is fair to say that the beneficiaries in 
Crummey retained a vested economic interest in the trust corpus, even after lapse of their 
demand power.  Furthermore, the Crummey trust language comports with the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s implicit policy goal in Crummey, that is, to allow grantors the benefit of the annual 
exclusion when providing for the future support of their minor children. See supra Section 
VI.A.  
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ties, would likely never occur.120 To assume that a contingency based 
upon the death of two healthy individuals within four months of an-
other is as likely to vest as one based upon a trustee’s discretion 
(which is guided by specific parameters outlined in a trust instru-
ment) is the logical equivalent of saying that you are as likely to get 
struck by lightning as you are to stub your toe.121 Given this distinc-
tion, Cristofani improperly applied the Crummey precedent to a class 
of beneficiaries never contemplated by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. In 
turn, Cristofani’s reliance upon the reasoning in Crummey without a 
corresponding analysis of the probability of vesting in each case was 
unjustifiable and warranted much greater scrutiny than it received. 
 More fundamental than the Cristofani court’s failure to recognize 
the different vesting probabilities was its overly broad reading of the 
Crummey decision. By focusing its analysis upon the facts presented 
before it, the Ninth Circuit in Crummey implicitly intended to limit 
its decision to those facts.122 The purpose of the Crummey opinion 
was not to create a new mechanism of estate tax avoidance, but to 
eliminate an inherent inequity in the tax treatment of gifts to minors 
and adults.123 Despite this goal, the Tax Court in Cristofani chose to 
engage in an analysis and application of the Crummey decision with-
out recognizing the Ninth Circuit’s implicit attempt to control the 
breadth of its opinion.124 The Cristofani court in turn interpreted the 
Ninth Circuit’s silence in the broadest sense possible, finding that 
Crummey did not require “that the beneficiaries of a trust must have 
a vested present interest or vested remainder interest in the trust 
corpus or income, in order to qualify for the 2503(b) exclusion.”125 
                                                                                                                    
 120. The Cristofani court went so far as to recognize that each of the primary benefici-
aries had, and at all times prior to and after the death of the decedent, been in perfect 
health. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 84-85. 
 121. Despite this obvious factual inconsistency, the Cristofani court, relying heavily 
upon the reasoning in Crummey, flatly rejected any consideration of the probability of fu-
ture vesting. Rather, the court focused solely upon the beneficiary’s legal right to exercise 
their demand power as the only relevant factor in determining whether a transfer of pre-
sent interest was made. (In fact, the Cristofani court even went so far as to recognize the 
fact that each of the primary beneficiaries had, and at all times prior to and after the death 
of the decedent, been in perfect health.) Such a simplistic test may have been warranted 
regarding the rather benign contingency in Crummey, but the court’s application of the 
same test, without more, to the contingency interests in Cristofani represents a complete 
disregard for the fairly blatant factual distinctions between Crummey and Cristofani. 
 122. The Ninth Circuit rejected the opportunity to establish a bright line rule (taken 
from a lower court decision), believing that it did not fit the facts in its case. See Crummey, 
397 F.2d at 88 (“In another case we might follow the broader Kieckhefer rule since it seems 
least arbitrary and establishes a clear standard.”). Moreover, throughout the Crummey 
opinion, the Ninth Circuit made constant references to “our” case, implicitly limiting the 
scope of its holding to the specific facts presented before the court. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See supra note 89. 
 125. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 83. 
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 By turning a blind eye to the obvious circumstantial distinctions 
between its case and Crummey, as well as the implicit limits placed 
upon the Crummey precedent by the Ninth Circuit, the Cristofani de-
cision expanded the class of eligible Crummey beneficiaries far be-
yond what was contemplated by the court in Crummey. Affording a 
grantor the opportunity to take advantage of the annual exclusion in 
a situation where the beneficiary of the Crummey power has little or 
no opportunity to receive a share of the trust corpus (other than the 
annual demand power) is a subversion of both the policy rationale 
behind Crummey,126 and the general purpose of allowing an annual 
exclusion in the first instance.127 
VIII.   PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
 Although thirty-six years of jurisprudence has solidified accep-
tance of the Crummey power as a viable estate-planning tool, the 
practical use of the Crummey power is fundamentally at odds with 
the underlying goals of the tax system as a whole. 
A.   Crummey Powers Are a Subversion of the Annual Exclusion 
 The first, and most basic flaw recognized by many commentators 
is that Crummey powers represent a clear subversion of the Con-
gressional purpose behind allowing an annual exclusion. In creating 
an annual exclusion to the gift tax, Congress intended to only cover 
small, customary gifts to “obviate the necessity of keeping account” of 
such gifts for tax purposes.128 When viewed in this context, Crummey 
powers, even when granted to vested beneficiaries, certainly tend to 
subvert the spirit behind the exclusion. If the annual exclusion was 
intended to cover only relatively small, customary gifts one normally 
provides for friends and family during the course of a year, it is hard 
to imagine how Crummey powers fall within those parameters.  
 For instance, picture a suburban Chicago Christmas, and little, 
four year-old Maggie makes her way down the stairs to find two gifts 
from her Grandma Willie under the tree: a shiny red bicycle with a 
bow on it and a wrapped box with a gleaming piece of paper notifying 
her that she has thirty days to exercise an $11,000 Crummey with-
drawal right. Although Maggie is intelligent beyond her years, it is 
safe to say that she only views one as a “gift.” Why? Because a bike is 
something that the average person would see as a regular, run of the 
mill Christmas present. A bike at Christmas is no different than a 
doll for her birthday, a $100 savings bond for her first communion, or 
$5,000 for her college graduation. The $11,000 withdrawal right, on 
                                                                                                                    
 126. See supra Section VI.A. 
 127. See supra Section III. 
 128. S. REP. NO. 72-665, at 41 (1932); accord H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 29 (1932). 
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the other hand, is clearly not considered a “gift” in the same sense by 
Maggie—or anyone else for that matter.129 Yes, Maggie has a thirty 
day “right” to that $11,000, but what is “ordinary” about such a 
right? Even an $11,000 bicycle at Christmas and a thirty-day lapsing 
withdrawal right are certainly not “ordinary” in the same sense. 
Using this reasoning, many argue that the Crummey power is not a 
“gift” recognized under the annual exclusion, and as such should be 
considered a gift of future interest. 
B.   Horizontal Inequity Created Between Grantors Who                        
Use and Do Not Use Crummey Gifts 
 Maggie’s situation illustrates a related problem with Crummey 
powers. Assuming that Grandma Willie’s $11,000 “Crummey” 
Christmas present to Maggie is considered a gift for purposes of the 
annual exclusion, then the threshold amount for annual gifts allow-
able under the exclusion is met, thereby rendering any additional gift 
from Grandma Willie to Maggie during the same year taxable as an 
inter-vivos transfer.130 Under this scenario, Grandma Willie would 
owe gift taxes on the value of the bicycle given to Maggie (in addition 
to the total value of any other gifts to Maggie made throughout the 
year for her birthday, Easter, and other holidays or special occa-
sions). Gift taxes are rarely, if ever, paid on the value of incidental 
gifts given to a beneficiary in excess of the annual exclusion amount 
used to cover the value of the Crummey withdrawal right. Thus, in 
an ironic twist of fate, the very same gifts that Congress intended to 
cover with the annual exclusion are not taxed when, in fact, they 
should be. This problem of Crummey grantors “double dipping” at 
the annual exclusion effectively blurs the amount excludable under 
I.R.C. § 2503(c) into an indeterminate number, amenable to the 
needs of each individual Crummey grantor.  
 As a result of “double dipping,” a horizontal inequity problem is 
created between those who grant lapsing withdrawal rights and still 
give those beneficiaries “ordinary” gifts (Crummey taxpayers), and 
those taxpayers that only give “ordinary” gifts (regular, non-
Crummey taxpayers). Because Crummey taxpayers can effectively 
increase the amount of the annual exclusion available to them by 
“double dipping,” they are placed at a significant tax advantage when 
                                                                                                                    
 129. After all, if Maggie wanted to be careful and leave her new bike untouched until 
spring, would her parents take it back after thirty days? Of course not. That is not what a 
gift is about. On the other hand, if Maggie wanted to wait until March to exercise the 
withdrawal right she received at Christmas, she would find that the “gift” was removed 
from her reach until some point in the distant future. When Maggie’s right to the $11,000 
is not absolute, how can she say that she has “received” anything? 
 130. See I.R.C. §§ 2501(a), 2001(c) (2002). 
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compared to taxpayers who do not utilize a lapsing withdrawal 
power.  
 For example, imagine two taxpayers, Arnold and Willis, each with 
$5,000,000 estates. During the course of a year, Willis gives his 
granddaughter Kimberly three gifts totaling $16,000. At tax time, 
Willis claims all three gifts to Kimberly. Because of the annual ex-
clusion, Willis will not be taxed on the first $11,000 of the gifts to 
Kimberly, but will incur gift tax liability on the $5,000 in excess of 
the exclusion amount. Not to be outdone, Arnold gives his grandson 
Abraham incidental gifts (on his birthday, Christmas, Arbor Day, 
and so forth) totaling $5,000. In addition, Arnold has set up a 
Crummey trust naming Abraham as sole beneficiary. Each year Ar-
nold grants Abraham an $11,000 withdrawal right that Abraham al-
lows to lapse. When tax time rolls around, Arnold claims the $11,000 
lapsing demand power under the annual exclusion, but never claims 
the $5,000 in incidental gifts to Abraham because, as he says, “How 
can normal gifts be taxable?” Arnold is partially right. Ordinary gifts 
are not supposed to be taxable; they are meant to be captured by the 
annual exclusion. However, when the full annual exclusion amount 
has already been exhausted by a lapsing demand right to a benefici-
ary, the value of ordinary gifts to that same beneficiary should theo-
retically be considered a taxable inter-vivos transfer.131  
 Unfortunately for the fisc, the Arnolds of the world do not count 
the ordinary gifts made to beneficiaries in excess of the $11,000 
claimed for the lapsing demand power; and therein lies the inequity 
to taxpayers like Willis. While Willis is taxed on the excess $5,000 
given to Kimberly, Arnold, who gifted the same total amount to 
Abraham, is not taxed because incidental gifts are never claimed 
and, by extension, never taxed. As a result, two similarly situated 
taxpayers are afforded different tax treatment due to one taxpayer’s 
utilization of the Crummey power. 
C.   Horizontal Inequity Between Crummey Grantors With Differing 
Beneficiary Pools 
 In addition to the horizontal inequity created by “double dipping,” 
Crummey powers also create horizontal inequity between similarly 
situated Crummey grantors. Again, by way of example, assume that 
two similarly situated taxpayers, Bo and Luke, each want to gift 
$55,000 into a trust for the benefit of their Uncle Jesse (who cannot 
be trusted with a demand right) while claiming the entire amount 
under the annual exclusion. Bo, who has five children, can simply 
grant each of his children a contingent remainder interest in the 
                                                                                                                    
 131. Id. 
2003]                             NAKED CRUMMEY POWERS 947 
 
trust and a corresponding demand power to achieve his of annually 
adding $55,000 into the trust under the I.R.C. § 2503(b) exclusion. 
Luke, on the other hand, has only two minor children and, thus, can 
only claim $22,000 under the annual exclusion (with the remaining 
$33,000 still includible in his estate).132 As a result, two similar tax-
payers with the same goal are treated differently under the Tax Code 
simply because one individual has more children that he can trust 
not to exercise the demand power.133  
D.   Parent Beneficiaries Who Act as Guardians for Minor 
Beneficiaries of the Same Trust 
 One of the more abusive situations involving Crummey powers oc-
curs when a beneficiary of a Crummey trust simultaneously serves 
as guardian over his minor child who has a contingent remainder in-
terest in the same trust.134 In such a situation, the minor beneficiary 
cannot be expected to make an effective demand, and thus the par-
ent, as guardian, makes the minor child’s decision to lapse for him. 
The problem in this scenario is that the parent cannot be expected to 
make an impartial decision for his minor children because the parent 
retains a vested interest in the trust corpus.  
 To illustrate, assume that a Crummey grantor, Howard Cunning-
ham, grants a $10,000 lapsing Crummey withdrawal right to his two 
sons, Richie and Fonzi. In addition, he grants a lapsing withdrawal 
right to Richie’s two children, Joanie, age four, and Chachi, age six. 
Under the trust instrument, Richie and Fonzi are the primary bene-
ficiaries, each to receive half of the accumulated trust corpus upon 
the death of the grantor. Further, if the grantor outlives both pri-
mary beneficiaries, Richie and Fonzi, then Joanie and Chachi share 
in Richie’s half of the corpus and Fonzi’s surviving issues get his 
share. 
 In most situations, all four beneficiaries will allow their demand 
powers to lapse. Richie and Fonzi each make their own decision to 
lapse, while Joanie and Chachi’s decision is made through their par-
ent and legal guardian, Richie. By making the decision to allow 
Joanie and Chachi’s Crummey power to lapse, Richie has effectively 
                                                                                                                    
 132. This hypothetical assumes that both Bo and Luke will only trust members of their 
immediate family with the demand power. For Luke to accomplish the goal of annually 
gifting away $55,000 tax-free, he would have to confer a demand power upon an extra-
family beneficiary, incurring a greater risk of exercise because an extra-family beneficiary 
does not have the same type of external pressures to allow lapse that a family member 
does (i.e., to stay in the good graces of the grantor to maintain a potential inheritance).   
 133. This hypothetical illustrates yet another problem presented by lapsing demand 
powers: parental control over a minor child’s Crummey power. See infra Section IX.D. 
 134. See Cristofani v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 74 (1991). 
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increased his share of the trust corpus by $10,000.135 Because Richie’s 
interest in the trust corpus is vested, it is likely that he will receive 
his share of the corpus at some point in the future. That being the 
case, economic rationality demands that when an individual is pre-
sented with an opportunity to add to his overall wealth, he will exer-
cise the choice that affords him with the greatest increase in that 
wealth.136 For example, if an individual is presented with three bills 
on a table ($1, $20, and $100), the economically rational decision is to 
opt for the $100 bill. In much the same way, when Richie is pre-
sented with the opportunity to increase the amount in trust that will 
be payable to him in the future, economic rationality demands that 
he exercise that opportunity. 
 Thus far, the discussion has centered around the economic moti-
vation behind Richie’s decision to lapse Joanie and Chachi’s demand 
power. What about Joanie and Chachi’s economic motivation? After 
all, if their economic motivation to lapse is the same as Richie’s, then 
what harm is done by allowing Richie to do what Joanie and Chachi 
would have done anyway? Unfortunately, it is not that simple. Re-
member, Joani and Chachi are contingent beneficiaries whose inter-
est in the trust corpus is reliant on an outside event (the death of 
Richie within three months after the death of Howard) that in all 
likelihood will never occur, thereby making their probability of vest-
ing unlikely at best. Once again, economic rationality tells us that, 
when placed in the situation of choosing between sure money in the 
present, or unlikely money in the future, an individual will always 
choose sure money in the present.137 Therefore, under normal circum-
stances, Joanie and Chachi will always choose to exercise their de-
                                                                                                                    
 135. To further illustrate how Richie’s share is increased by allowing Joanie and Cha-
chi’s Crummey power to lapse, assume that Howard gifts away $10,000 per beneficiary for 
ten years and subsequently dies after the tenth year. If all four beneficiaries allow their 
power to lapse, the entire trust corpus would be composed of $400,000 ($200,000 for Richie 
and $200,000 for Fonzi). However, if Joanie and Chachi were to exercise their demand 
power in each of those years, then, at the end of the ten years Richie and Fonzi would only 
be left with $100,000 each. Thus, by allowing Joanie and Chachi’s power to lapse, Richie ef-
fectively doubles the amount available for distribution between Fonzi and himself upon 
Howard’s death.  
 136. An increase in wealth need not be immediate to be considered economically ra-
tional. For instance, a vested beneficiary will often allow a lapse of his Crummey power, 
and thus forgo the immediate increase in wealth, in order to keep the demand amount in 
the trust (which will likely produce a greater long-term rate of return on the $11,000 gift 
than could be achieved by a beneficiary if he were to invest it himself). Thus, the decision 
to lapse in that situation is economically rational and thus justified. See supra note 91; cf. 
Fogel, supra note 84, at 606-07 (arguing that the actuarial value of a vested beneficiary’s 
lapsed demand right will always be less than the present value of the Crummey gift be-
cause when the same lapsed demand power is placed in trust, it must be discounted to re-
flect the possibility that the beneficiary will not reach the age requirement specified in the 
trust language). 
 137. Of course, this assumes that there are not any external circumstances that would 
warrant a lapse.  
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mand power. 
 Having established that economic rationality dictates that Richie 
will always seek to increase his share in the corpus by allowing Joani 
and Chachi’s demand power to lapse, and Joani and Chachi will al-
ways choose to exercise their demand power (being contingent bene-
ficiaries), how do we reconcile these conflicting desires? Given that 
Richie’s economic interests are at odds with Joanie and Chachi’s,138 it 
simply cannot be said that Richie’s decision to lapse on behalf of 
Joanie and Chachi is completely objective. Why, then do we allow 
Richie to make that decision for Joanie and Chachi? The answer for 
some lies, in part, on the nature of intra-family relationships.  
 Although it is a maxim of human existence that most every paren-
tal decision is made with the child’s best interests in mind; as with 
everything else in life, there are plenty of exceptions to that rule.139 
As such, a minor child’s best interests are not always represented 
when a parent beneficiary is the one responsible for making the deci-
sion whether to exercise a child’s demand right. 
E.   Collusive Agreements Between Grantor and                           
Beneficiary Used to Assure Lapse 
 A related problem with allowing a parent beneficiary to exercise 
his child’s demand right is that such an arrangement effectively al-
lows a donor to multiply the number of exclusions available to them 
without increasing the corresponding risk of exercise. In granting 
Crummey powers to beneficiaries to claim the annual exclusion, the 
only real risk to any donor is that a beneficiary will exercise their 
withdrawal right, thereby eliminating the primary advantage of a 
Crummey trust (i.e., gifts in trust being considered present interest 
gifts in order to take advantage of the annual exclusion). Thus, above 
all else, Crummey donors want to be sure that their beneficiaries will 
not exercise their withdrawal right. Using the same hypothetical 
above, by granting withdrawal rights and corresponding contingency 
interests to Joanie and Chachi, Howard effectively doubled the 
amount he could siphon off from his estate to his children under the 
annual exclusion. Moreover, because Richie effectively exercises the 
demand rights for not only himself, but Joanie and Chachi as well, 
Howard is able to “kill three birds with one stone” and multiply the 
amount excludible from gift tax without a corresponding risk of exer-
cise. 
                                                                                                                    
 138. This is only from a purely economic standpoint, without any consideration given 
to intra-family externalities. 
 139. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 87-4 (where a parent, as the sole primary beneficiary of a trust, 
consistently allowed her minor child’s withdrawal right to lapse and upon the parent’s 
death, she left nothing to her child (who was an adult by that time)). 
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 Nevertheless, in order to preserve the tax effectiveness of his 
Crummey gifting plan, Howard must be assured that Richie and 
Fonzi will allow their Crummey powers to lapse. Otherwise, the gift 
is never placed in trust, and the transaction ultimately amounts to a 
roundabout method of gifting outright. As mentioned earlier, because 
Richie and Fonzi are the primary beneficiaries of the Cunningham 
Crummey trust, the decision to allow their Crummey powers to lapse 
has an economically rational justification because their future access 
to that property is not eliminated by the lapse, but merely post-
poned.140  
 However, if the facts in the Cunningham hypothetical are 
changed, and Fonzi’s interest in the trust principal is made contin-
gent upon his outliving Richie, Joanie, and Chachi by three months, 
then it follows that Fonzi will not allow his Crummey power to lapse 
because he will almost certainly never have access to that money 
again. Given this, how can Howard overcome the economic rational-
ity that demands Fonzi exercise the $11,000 withdrawal right, and 
thus be assured that Fonzi will allow lapse? The easiest, and thus 
most often employed, solution to Howard’s dilemma is to simply come 
to a prearranged “understanding” with Fonzi whereby Fonzi guaran-
tees Howard that he will not exercise his demand right.141 Thus, once 
he is assured that Fonzi will allow his Crummey power to lapse, 
Howard can safely convey an additional $11,000 (along with the 
$33,000 transferred to Richie, Joanie and Chachi) under the annual 
exclusion into the Cunningham trust meant to benefit only Richie 
and his heirs. 
 From the Service’s perspective, the problem with these prear-
ranged agreements is that Howard is afforded the benefit of the an-
nual exclusion for the demand power given to Fonzi when, given the 
preexisting “understanding” not to exercise, Fonzi was not “really” 
granted the present right to the $11,000. Because Fonzi’s “use, pos-
session or enjoyment”142 of his right to $11,000 is, for all practical 
purposes, eliminated by the prior agreement, then the demand right 
cannot be considered a present interest and the annual exclusion 
should be denied. Thus, the IRS would contend, the Crummey power 
given to Fonzi in this situation is illusory and should not qualify for 
the annual exclusion.  
 Despite the logic behind the Service’s position, any attempt to 
prove the existence of such an “understanding” has proven difficult. 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that these agreements are of-
                                                                                                                    
 140. See supra notes 91 and 136. 
 141. Often this “understanding” is secured by a beneficiary’s belief that he will be “pe-
nalized”—via a reduction or elimination of their interests in future gifts and/or bequests 
from the grantor—if he exercises his withdrawal right. 
 142. Kieckhefer v. Comm’r, 189 F.2d 118, 121 (1951). 
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ten implied between family members, leaving the government with 
very little tangible evidence with which to prove its case. As a result, 
courts have been reluctant to recognize the validity of the “lapse 
agreement” argument due to the subjectivity involved in making 
such a determination.143    
IX.   SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
 Given the potential for abuse of the annual exclusion established 
by Cristofani and its progeny, it is relatively clear that a change to 
the structure of the annual exclusion is necessary if the IRS is to 
maintain the integrity of the gift tax. Only one question remains: 
What do we change? 
A.   Elimination of the Crummey Power 
 As an answer to Crummey’s subversion of the purpose behind the 
annual exclusion, some argue that the availability of the annual ex-
clusion to all lapsing demand powers should be eliminated.144 After 
all, if the donor truly intended to give a beneficiary a present interest 
in the property subject to the demand power, he would have simply 
given that beneficiary an outright gift. Moreover, such a solution 
would subsequently solve the horizontal equity problem faced by our 
friends Arnold and Willis.145 However, such a remedy undermines the 
                                                                                                                    
 143. See Holland v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3236 (1997). Despite having found that 
there was an “informal agreement” regarding the beneficiaries’ decision to lapse their 
Crummey demand right, the Holland court held that so long as an agreement between the 
parties is not legally binding, the annual exclusion will not be denied on the basis of a pre-
arranged “understanding” between the parties. Id. at 3237. Given that the vast majority of 
Crummey powers are conveyed in the intra-family context, any agreement between donor 
and donee to ensure lapse of that power will often, if not always, be informal in nature. As 
a result, the Holland court’s insistence on legal enforceability is particularly damaging to 
the Service’s ability to combat Crummey abuse through their prearranged “understanding” 
argument.  
 Cf. Kohlsaat v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2732 (1997). Decided only a few months prior 
to Holland, the Kohlsaat court took a much more accepting view of the Service’s prear-
ranged “understanding” argument. Although the Kohlsaat court ultimately sided with the 
taxpayers and refused to infer an agreement from the surrounding circumstances, its deci-
sion was not based upon the legal enforceability of the agreement between donor and 
donee. Rather, the court refused to accept the Service’s prearranged “understanding” ar-
gument because the record lacked sufficient evidence to prove the existence of such an 
agreement. Id. at 2734. Thus, the Kohlsaat decision seems to imply that in cases where 
there is sufficient evidence of a prearranged “understanding” not to exercise a Crummey 
demand right, the annual exclusion should be denied, regardless of the legal enforceability 
of such an “understanding.” See also Trotter v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 633, 637 (2001) 
(finding that the terms of the trust, coupled with the circumstances surrounding its opera-
tion, were “supportive of an implied understanding that the withdrawal rights would not 
be exercised” (emphasis added)). 
 144. See Arash, supra note 62, at 111-12; Nicholas A. Vilestra, Estate of Cristofani v. 
Commissioner: The Expanded Potential of Crummey Powers for Transfer Tax Avoidance, 
45 TAX LAW. 583, 595 (1992). 
 145. See supra Section VIII.B. 
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sound policy rationale for allowing donors the ability to take advan-
tage of the annual exclusion through Crummey powers. As discussed 
earlier in this Comment, the purpose of the Crummey power is to 
right the inequity between taxpayers who can provide for beneficiar-
ies through annual outright gifts (because those beneficiaries are 
mature enough to manage the property effectively) and those donors 
who wish to do the same for beneficiaries who cannot be trusted to 
manage the gift in an efficient manner.146 Thus, when limited to 
those beneficiaries with a vested interest in the trust of equal or 
greater value than their cumulative demand powers, the Crummey 
power serves a rational public policy function that should not be 
eliminated on account of abusive situations that exist beyond that 
purpose.147 
B.   Change the Annual Exclusion From a Per                                
Donee Model to a Per Donor Model 
 Another suggestion espoused by many commentators to eliminate 
abuse of the annual exclusion has been to base the exclusion on a 
“per donor” model rather than the current “per donee” system.148 Un-
der the per donor model, rather than cap the exclusion amount on 
the basis of gifts given to a single donee, the exclusion would be 
based upon the total amount gifted by a donor in a given year. Al-
though the overall amount of the exclusion would likely increase, this 
solution would nevertheless create an absolute threshold on annual 
gifts and thus place a significant limit on potential abuse of the ex-
clusion. Assuming that the annual exclusion is bumped up to $50,000 
per donor, the horizontal inequity between our friends Bo and Luke 
would effectively be eliminated given that each would now be able to 
claim the entire $50,000 under the annual exclusion no matter how 
many children each had.149 
 The per donor model has significant merit when placed in the con-
text of Crummey powers. Capping the amount of the annual exclu-
sion based upon the donor, while raising the amount excludible in a 
reasonable manner, not only eliminates the potential for significant 
abuse, but also maintains the integrity of the policy rationale behind 
allowing Crummey powers.150 In turn, such a reform serves as a justi-
                                                                                                                    
 146. See supra Section VI.A. 
 147. Although this solution wins a blue ribbon for simplicity, it is nothing more than a 
knee-jerk reaction that reaches too far to solve a relatively narrow problem. 
 148. See, e.g., Steinkamp, supra note 8. 
 149. Moreover, the per donor model has the added benefit of virtually eliminating abu-
sive situations like Cristofani because a per donor limit of $50,000 would serve as the 
equivalent to a five beneficiary cap under the current per donee model. 
 150. See supra Section VI.A. 
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fiable middle ground between complete elimination of the Crummey 
power and the current system. 
C.   Creation of an Independent Fiduciary for Minor Beneficiaries 
 The examples presented earlier concerning the Cunningham clan 
are some of the more abusive and ubiquitous abuses of the annual 
exclusion through the use of Crummey powers.151 By permitting a 
parent with a vested economic interest in the trust to allow his minor 
child’s right to withdrawal lapse, the economic interests of the child 
are not met. In other legal arenas, when a child’s best interests are 
not met by a parent, a court or statute will step in and appoint an 
agent to ensure that the minor child is properly represented.152 Minor 
Crummey beneficiaries should be treated no differently. Therefore, 
rather than relying upon a parent beneficiary with an economic in-
terest in their minor child’s lapse, a statutorily mandated independ-
ent fiduciary should be appointed in cases where the exercise of a 
minor child’s withdrawal right is dependent upon a parent benefici-
ary with a vested interest in the same trust. The fiduciary, guided by 
the circumstances surrounding the demand power, may be seen as 
the gatekeeper of economic rationality, ensuring that the integrity of 
the withdrawal power is kept intact.153 Moreover, this remedy 
provides an added benefit to courts in that it removes the burden of 
having to subjectively determine why a particular demand was not 
made because the court may assume that a decision to lapse made by 
an independent fiduciary was in the absolute best interests of the 
child. 
 In addition, the presence of an independent fiduciary serves to 
curb abuse of the annual exclusion through the multiplication of con-
tingent beneficiaries without any corresponding risk of exercise. As 
indicated by the Cunningham hypothetical, a Crummey grantor can 
increase the number of annual exclusions claimed in a given year 
simply by granting the children of each primary beneficiary a mean-
ingless contingent interest in the trust and giving them a lapsing 
withdrawal right. Therefore, so long as the Crummey grantor can en-
sure that the parent will not withdraw, there is no increase in risk 
that the contingent beneficiaries will exercise their demand power ei-
ther (because the parent will make the decision for them). However, 
the situation is drastically changed when it is no longer an economi-
                                                                                                                    
 151. See supra Section VIII.D. 
 152. For example, in large tort settlements in which the plaintiff is a minor, a court 
will often step in and appoint a guardian to oversee distributions of the settlement to en-
sure that the child’s economic best interests are maintained. 
 153. After all, if the Crummey grantor truly intended to give the beneficiary an abso-
lute right to demand, then actual withdrawal will have no unexpected consequence to the 
donor. 
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cally interested parent making the decision to lapse, but rather an 
independent fiduciary who will make a determination based upon the 
best interests of the child. In such a situation, a Crummey grantor 
cannot be certain that the minor beneficiary’s demand power will be 
lapsed, thereby defeating the purpose behind granting the demand 
power to begin with. As a result, with the fear that an independent 
fiduciary will actually exercise a minor beneficiary’s demand right, 
Crummey grantors will be less likely to grant minor beneficiaries 
demand powers coupled with meaningless contingency rights in 
trust, thereby reducing the number of “sham” annual exclusions 
claimed by grantors such as Howard Cunningham. 
D.   Establish a Five-Year Window of Review for All Trusts With 
Lapsing Demand Powers 
 Due to the reluctance of most courts to recognize the validity of 
the pre-arranged “understanding” argument, the Service has been 
relatively unsuccessful in combating the use of lapsing Crummey 
powers to multiply the amount that grantors may transfer into trust 
under the annual exclusion. For most courts, the problem with the 
pre-arranged “understanding” argument lies in the fact that it relies 
primarily upon a subjective assumption by the IRS—that is, absent 
an agreement between the grantor and beneficiary, the decision to 
lapse is illogical.154 In turn, to remove the taint of subjectivity from 
its attack on abusive Crummey powers, the IRS should employ an ob-
jective mechanism that will not only effectively determine the valid-
ity of a Crummey beneficiary’s decision to allow lapse, but also con-
fine the availability of the annual exclusion to only those Crummey 
beneficiaries that are in keeping with the policy rationale underlying 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Crummey. 
 One method by which the IRS may accomplish this two-pronged 
goal is through the creation of a five-year “look back” window that 
the Service can use to determine the validity of the annual exclusions 
claimed under a Crummey trust. Under this approach, the IRS will 
review all Crummey trusts five years after their creation and, in do-
ing so, utilize three objective factors to determine whether the an-
nual exclusions claimed by way of Crummey withdrawal powers were 
bone fide present interest gifts, and therefore justified.  
 First, the Service must look to the relationship between the gran-
tor and the beneficiaries that received lapsing withdrawal rights dur-
ing the first five years of the trust. Any decision to lapse made by a 
beneficiary that is a direct descendent (son or daughter) of the gran-
tor will be considered genuine per se, so long as that beneficiary has 
                                                                                                                    
 154. See Fogel, supra note 84, at 612. 
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an irrevocable vested interest in the trust principal. In turn, the an-
nual exclusions claimed with regard to the Crummey powers granted 
to those beneficiaries will stand, thereby exempting them from any 
future “look back.” 
 If, however, an annual exclusion is claimed for a lapsed demand 
power granted to a beneficiary other than a direct descendent, a five-
year “look back” window will be triggered. Using this “look back,” the 
Service will review the actual operation of the withdrawal rights 
granted to those beneficiaries. If it is determined that any of the non-
exempted beneficiaries have failed to exercise their Crummey de-
mand rights in more than two of the first five years of the trust’s ex-
istence, then the annual exclusions claimed for those beneficiaries 
will be deemed illusory, and the grantor will no longer be afforded 
the benefit of the annual exclusion for any future lapsing demand 
powers given to that beneficiary. To prevent grantors from circum-
venting the purpose of the five-year “look back” by simply complying 
with the requirements for the first five years of the trust, the Service 
will again review the trust every ten years thereafter to ensure com-
pliance.155 
 Finally, regardless of whether a beneficiary is exempted from the 
“look back” or not, at each point of review (five years from date of 
creation and every ten years thereafter) the Service will review each 
lapsing demand power to ensure that it fully complied with the no-
tice and opportunity to exercise requirements set forth in Revenue 
Ruling 81-7.156 Any lapsing withdrawal right granted to a beneficiary 
that fails to meet the notice and opportunity-to-exercise require-
ments will be deemed illusory and thus fail to qualify for the annual 
exclusion in each year where the requirements were not met. 
 Although far from perfect, this proposed solution avoids the pit-
falls of the Service’s current pre-arranged “understanding” argument 
by employing a mechanical test that is reliant only upon objective 
criteria to prove the genuineness of a Crummey demand right. More-
over, this answer maintains the spirit of Crummey by limiting the 
use of the Crummey mechanism to the beneficiaries that were of 
primary concern to the Ninth Circuit—the grantor’s children. 
X.   CONCLUSION 
 When Crummey powers are utilized outside of their originally in-
tended context, the potential for abuse of the annual exclusion is ex-
ponentially increased to a point that borders on inevitability. This 
abuse comes in all shapes and sizes, with the greatest opportunity for 
                                                                                                                    
 155. The ten-year review will require a beneficiary to have exercised his withdrawal 
right in six of the ten years reviewed in order for the annual exclusions to be deemed valid. 
 156. See Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474; supra text accompanying note 42. 
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abuse arising in the context of beneficiaries with a “naked” demand 
right. Despite this abuse, the Crummey power is a firmly entrenched 
legal tool with a sound policy rationale behind it. Due to the justifi-
able policy goals furthered by Crummey powers, Crummey need only 
be fixed, not eliminated altogether. In turn, the IRS and the legal 
community are best served by looking for specific solutions to the 
narrow problems created by the Crummey power, rather than push-
ing for an all out repeal of the Crummey decision. 
 By far, the most equitable of these specific reforms is the per do-
nor annual exclusion model. It is the only solution that can both 
maintain the integrity of the annual exclusion, while at the same 
time preserve the justifiable policy rationale behind Crummey. Once 
instituted, such a policy will finally afford parents the opportunity to 
pass on to their children what is rightfully theirs, and render unto 
Caesar what is rightfully his. 
 
